云制造平台中用户跳单行为的三方演化博弈分析
The Jump-dealing Behavior of Users in Cloud Manufacturing Platform Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis
宫婷 1吴锋1
作者信息
- 1. 西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安 710049;教育部过程控制与效率工程重点实验室,陕西西安 710049
- 折叠
摘要
随着工业4.0和智能制造的提出,作为供需双方媒介的云制造平台的应用更加广泛,而在利益的驱使下平台跳单现象也屡见不鲜.针对云制造平台中服务提供方和服务需求方的跳单行为,建立了云制造平台、服务提供方和服务需求方的三方演化博弈模型,并对演化稳定策略进行分析,同时运用数值仿真得到了不同因素对演化结果的影响.结果表明:平台采取措施是抑制跳单行为的有效方法,具体包括加强监管提高发现跳单行为的概率,合理制定收取的惩罚金额及其分摊比例,增加服务需求方的信息搜索成本;当平台不采取措施时,应收取低于阈值的中介费用比例,并增加服务提供方的信息搜索成本从而抑制跳单行为.
Abstract
With the proposal of Industrial 4.0 and intelligent manufacturing,the cloud manufacturing platform,as the intermediary of both service providers and service demanders,is widely used,which causes the phenomenon of the jump-dealing behavior to be more and more common.Focusing on the jump-dealing behavior of service providers and service demanders in the cloud manufacturing platform,a tripartite evolutionary game model was established and the evolutionary stability strategy was analyzed.At the same time,the method of simulation was used to get the impact of different factors on the evolution results.The results show that taking measures is an effective way to restrain the jump-dealing behavior,including strengthening supervision to increase the probability of finding out the jump-dealing behavior,reasonably charging the amount of punishment fees and setting its allocation ratio between service providers and service demanders,and increasing the information search cost of service demanders.When the platform does not take measures,the proportion of intermediary fees below the threshold should be charged,and the information search cost of the service provider should be increased so as to restrain the jump-dealing behavior.
关键词
云制造平台/跳单行为/三方演化博弈/仿真分析Key words
cloud manufacturing platform/jump-dealing behavior/tripartite evolutionary game/simulation analysis引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家重点研发计划(2018YFB1703001)
国家自然科学基金(71871177)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据