Profit Distribution Mechanism and Coordination Research in the Agent Emergency Supplies Reservation Considering Multi-agent Participation
The method of emergency supplies reservation with multi-agent participation alleviates the uncertainty and urgency of emergency supplies demands.However,the complex benefit gambling relations among multiple parties increase the difficulty of government coordination.The revenue expectations and decisions between the government and enterprises were analyzed and compared respectively in centralized decisions and decentralized decisions.The rewards and punishment coefficient and revenue distribution ratio were set to deal with the interests gambling conflicts under the decentralized decision.The profit distribution mechanism and coordination model were designed in the agent emergency supplies reservation considering multi-agent participation.The research shows that the unique total reserves maximizing the total expectation utility of enterprises is existed.When the rewards and punishment coefficient and revenue distribution ratio match conditions,the total amount of emergency material reserves is positively correlated with the number of participating enterprises,and negatively correlated with the degree of enterprise risk aversion.There is a unique parameter composed of the unit subsidy quota and the revenue distribution ratio to make the system coordinate.Finally,under the premise of the changes of risk aversion degree and the number of enterprises,the calculation example simulated the changes of the optimal value range of the revenue distribution ratio,the variation of the expected revenue,expectation utility of the government,enterprises,and the supply chain.
agent emergency supplies reservationmulti-agentprofit distributioncoordination model
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
