Study on Configuration Strategy and Payment Schemes of E-visits Based on Game Theory
Configuring e-visits has become an effective way to reduce medical costs and improve patients'experience.Public hospitals introduce e-visits by reallocating existing resources.The national healthcare security administration(NHSA)reimburses public hospitals,which affects the resource allocation strategy of public hospitals.A Stackelberg game embedded with a queuing model was formulated for the healthcare system consisting of a public hospital and the NHSA.The optimal resource allocation strategy of the public hospital and the optimal reimbursement strategy of the NHSA were investigated under different payment schemes.Three payment schemes were discussed.Bundled payment(BP)bundled the payment for online and offline service.Fee for service(FFS)separately paid for the online and offline service.Penalty scheme(PS)penalized the public hospital on revisit patients.The social welfare under different payment schemes was compared.The results show that BP performs well only when the optimal decision of public hospitals happens to coincide with the social welfare well.Otherwise,PS performs the best in most cases,while FFS outperforms others in some cases.Both PS and FFS yield the same social welfare when the budget is sufficient,and the sensitivity of revisit rates to resource allocation and the unit convenience-and-risk-reduction gain are large.
万方数据
维普
