Closed-loop Supply Chain Decisions with Quality Grading of Used Products under the Online Agency-selling/collection Mode
A closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)composed of a manufacturer and an online platform was considered.The manufacturer consigned both the sales of new products and the collection of used products to the online platform.The online platform graded the returned used products according to their quality levels and adopted corresponding recycling ways.The optimal decisions of the CLSC under three game structures(manufacturer-led Stackelberg game,online platform-led Stackelberg game,and Nash equilibrium game between them)were respectively discussed.The results show that considering the recycling of used products according to their quality levels under the three game structures,if the unit production cost is small,both the manufacturer and the online platform make the most profit when they are in a leadership position.However,when the unit production cost increases to a certain extent,it will get the maximum optimal profit when the other party is in the leading position.Besides,when the power of two sides is in balance,the optimal profit of each side is not dominant.Moreover,when the unit production cost is within a certain range,the manufacturer and the online platform will tend to decrease the commission ratio.In other cases,the two sides will be inconsistent in the commission ratio.
万方数据
维普
