摘要
后期维特根斯坦批判以逻辑作为语言意义根基的语言观,以解构由逻辑命令来决定和保存的形而上学基础.他的哲学文本因而不仅仅是对某个观点的阐述,还是一种关于批判方法的书写,以及带有浓郁反讽和否定色彩以解构元叙事的风格化书写.维特根斯坦在其哲学文本中惯常使用重复与悖反修辞,以及反讽性的自我引用和自我否定式表达,在看起来最正常和理所当然的词汇及意义中发现偶然性和不稳定性因素,并对之加以拆解、打乱和反讽性重组,从而对自我同一性的语言符号进行解构,最终通过对于意义和科学真理间的同一性这一形而上学逻辑的否定,在语言游戏中打开了语言意义的可能性场域.
Abstract
The later Wittgenstein criticism uses logic as the basis of linguistic meaning to deconstruct the metaphysical foundations that are determined and preserved by logical commands.His philosophical texts are thus not only an exposi-tion towards a certain view,but also a writing about the method of criticism,as well as a stylized writing with strong iron-ic and negative overtones to deconstruct meta-narratives.In his philosophical texts,Wittgenstein often adopts repetitive and paradoxical rhetoric,as well as ironic expressions of self-referential and self-negation,looks for chance and in-stable factors out of the most normal and natural words and meanings,and then through disintegration,disruption,and an ironical reorganization,he deconstructs the linguistic symbols of self-identity,and ultimately,through the denial of the identity of meaning and of scientific truth,he is able to make a new sense of the metaphysical logic of Wittgenstein's philosophy.Ultimately,through the negation of the metaphysical logic of the identity between meaning and scientific truth,he opens a field of possibility of linguistic meaning in the language game.