Research on the Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Sudden Water Pollution in the Central Route Project of South-to-North Water Diversion
Sudden water pollution has become a major safety hazard restricting the sustainable water diversion of the Central Route Project of South-to-North Water Diversion,and it is urgent to solve the ecological compensation mechanism design problem of sudden water pollution in the Central Route Project.Aiming at the sudden water pollution scenario of the trunk canal of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project that should be held responsible by the Central Route Construction Man-agement Bureau of South-to-North Water Diversion Project,from the perspective of multi-stakeholder cooperation,it is pro-posed the ecological compensation mechanism of sudden water pollution that the Central Route Bureau provides ecological replenishment to the pollution-bearing government,the Nash bargaining model is constructed between the Central Route Bu-reau and the pollution-bearing government based on the cooperative game theory,and taking Dengzhou City in Henan as an example to carry out a case study,the main research results shows:① The days of ecological water replenishment and the total loss of pollution containment show a significant positive correlation,and with the gradual increase of the total loss of pollution,the influence of the bargaining power of the Central Route Bureau on the days of water replenishment shows a marginal decreasing characteristic.② There is a significant positive relationship between the ecological water replenishment cost of the Central Route Bureau and the days of ecological water replenishment,with the enhancement of the bargaining power of the Central Route Bureau,the scale effect of ecological water replenishment costs has shown a certain weakening trend.③ Within a certain scale of ecological water replenishment,the Central Route Bureau and the pollution-bearing gov-ernment can establish an effective cooperative alliance.
the Central Route Project of South-to-North Water Diversionsudden water pollutionNash bargaining gameecological compensation mechanism