首页|政府补贴与绿色奶牛养殖业发展的演化博弈分析

政府补贴与绿色奶牛养殖业发展的演化博弈分析

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随着环境污染问题愈演愈烈，国家越来越重视推进各行业节能降碳，奶牛养殖业作为碳排放比较大的行业，绿色低碳养殖成为必然趋势。基于演化博弈理论，构建政府、乳品企业和奶牛养殖场之间的三方演化博弈模型并对博弈结果进行数学推导，运用Matlab 2020b对系统进行数值仿真并对各方参与者的稳定策略进行探讨，分析三方博弈中均衡点的稳定性。结果表明:(1)补贴系数为 0。4～0。6 时是恰当的，即奶牛养殖场更倾向于选择绿色养殖，乳品加工企业选择购买，政府更愿意补贴，三方状态接近稳定。(2)当骗补系数为 0。6 时，三方利益得到满足进而达到稳定状态。(3)惩罚系数增大，短期对奶牛养殖场影响不明显，长期来看，有利于奶牛养殖场向绿色养殖化方向演化，对乳制品加工企业影响不大。提出政府应完善补贴机制、惩罚机制、增加补贴的多样性、政府的惩罚系数应与相关者和市场规律相结合进行动态调整等对策建议，以保障奶业绿色低碳健康可持续发展。
An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Subsidies and Development of Green Dairy Farming Industry
With the increasing severity of environmental pollution,China is paying more and more attention to promoting energy conservation and carbon reduction in various industries.The dairy farming is a high carbon e-missions industry,and the green and low-carbon farming has become an inevitable trend.Based on evolutionary game theory,a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed among the government,dairy enterprises,and dairy farms,and the game results were mathematically derived.Matlab 2020b was used to numerically sim-ulate the system and the stability strategies of all participants were explored,and the stability of equilibrium points in the tripartite game was analyzed.The results indicated that:(1)the subsidy coefficient of 0.4-0.6 was appropriate,meaning that dairy farms were more inclined to choose green farming,dairy processing enterprises chose to purchase,the government was more willing to subsidize,and the tripartite situation was close to stability.(2)when the fraud compen-sation coefficient was 0.6,the interests of the three parties were satisfied and reached a stable state.(3)the increase in punishment coefficient had little impact on dairy farms in the short term,but in the long run,it was beneficial for dairy farms to evolve towards green farming,with little impact on dairy processing enterprises.The suggestions were proposed that the government should improve subsidy and punishment mechanisms,increase the diversity of subsidies,and dynamically adjust the punishment co-efficient in combination with relevant parties and market laws to ensure the green,low-carbon,healthy,and sustainable development of the dairy industry.

Government subsidyDairy farmDairy processing enterpriseTripartite evolutionary gameGreen culture

张艳新、王蕾、耿莹、祝丽云、李彤

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河北农业大学,河北 黄骅 061100

政府补贴 奶牛养殖场 乳品加工企业 三方演化博弈 绿色养殖

河北省科技计划沧州市社会科学发展研究项目河北省现代农业产业技术体系建设专项河北省省属高校基本科研业务费研究项目河北省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目河北省高等学校创新训练项目河北省高等学校创新训练项目

19227511D2023248HBCT2024230301KY2023084SQ202417520240162024018

2024

10.12148/hbnykx.20240028

河北农业科学
河北省农林科学院

河北农业科学

影响因子：0.52
ISSN：1088-1631
年,卷(期)：2024.28(2)
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