Evolutionary Game of Government and Enterprise in Carbon Emission Reduction under New Media Environment
Aiming at the issue of carbon emission reduction faced by China's economic development,and based on the perspective of system stability,this paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model between enterprises and the government by taking new media as the third-party supervision force and adopting the method of evolutionary game,and analyzes the influence degree and authenticity of media reports on the results of government and enterprises'behavior and strategy selection during the game process.The evolution process is simulated by MATLAB.The results show that:in carbon emission supervision,media intervention will change the behavior choice of the government and enterprises,accurate and efficient media reporting will effectively constrain the carbon emission behavior of enterprises,and at the same time,promote the government's active supervision;if the media lacks its authenticity on reporting the incident,it will interfere with the government's supervision,and aggravate the violation of the enterprise as well.It is suggested that the government should strengthen the guidance and regulation of the media,establish and improve a scientific,fair and reasonable media supervision mechanism and create a good public opinion environment.
carbon emission reductionnew mediaenterprise managementmarket evolution game
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万方数据
