政府监管下港口合作减排的博弈分析
Game Analysis of Port Cooperation Emission Reduction under Government Regulation
周施敏 1黄枭雄1
作者信息
- 1. 上海海事大学物流科学与工程学院,上海 201306
- 折叠
摘要
减少碳排放是全球共同面临的挑战.港口是全球贸易的重要节点,通过合作减排,可以共同降低碳排放,减缓气候变化的进程.然而,在港口合作减排过程中,经常会出现资源不匹配和港口之间缺乏协调等问题.为了鼓励自愿合作,将相邻港口之间的竞争转化为产生更大效率的整体协同作用,采用演化博弈的方法研究政府监管下港口企业合作减排演化过程,探讨港口之间的合作关系以及政府在港口合作过程中的作用.结果表明,适当的利润分配系数和奖惩政策可以促进三方博弈系统向稳定策略演化,并为政府和港口提供了相关建议.
Abstract
Carbon reduction is a global challenge.Ports are important nodes in global trade,and through cooperation in emission reduction,jointly reducing carbon emissions and slowing down the process of climate change can be achieved.However,in the process of port cooperation and e-mission reduction,there are often problems such as resource mismatch and lack of coordination between ports.Therefore,in order to encourage voluntary cooperation and transform competi-tion between adjacent ports into a more efficient overall collaborative effect,this article adopts an evolutionary game method to study the evolution process of government regulated port enterprise cooperation in emission reduction,in order to explore the cooperative relationship between ports and the role of the government in the port cooperation process.The results indicate that appro-priate profit distribution coefficients and reward and punishment policies can promote the evolu-tion of the tripartite game system towards a stable strategy,and provide relevant suggestions for the government and ports.
关键词
碳减排/政府监管/演化博弈/合作减排Key words
carbon emission reduction/government regulation/evolutionary game/cooperative e-mission reduction引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据