Does Joint Institutional Ownership Mitigate the Self-Serving Practices of Controlling Shareholders?
This study harnesses data from A-share listed firms spanning 2007 to 2021 to delve into the function of joint institutional ownership in the context of corporate secondary agency dilemmas.It unveils that joint institutional ownership notably curbs the self-serving practices of controlling shareholders.This deduction holds steady even post-application of Heckman two-stage,propensity score matching endogeneity,and robustness tests,which underlines that joint in-stitutional investors play the role of watchmen rather than conspirators.Mechanistic analysis sug-gests that joint institutional investors can restrain the self-serving practices of controlling share-holders via economies of scale,exit threats,and board member appointments.Further research discovers that,for non-state-owned firms,the aforesaid restraining effect is more conspicuous;joint institutional ownership can augment corporate value,and this impact intensifies as the share-holding ratio of the principal shareholder rises.Based on these findings,it is recommended that regulatory bodies proactively guide and oversee joint institutional ownership to assuage conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and small shareholders.Concurrently,firms should fully exploit the informational advantage of joint institutional ownership,earnestly propel inter-firm collaboration,and ceaselessly magnify corporate value.
joint institutional ownershipself-serving practices of controlling shareholdersboard member appointmentcorporate value
万方数据
维普
