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董事高管责任保险与企业社会责任:监督激励抑或机会主义

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基于沪深A股上市公司2006-2020年的数据,考察董事高管责任保险对企业社会责任承担的影响效果及其作用机制.研究发现,引入董责险能够显著提升企业履行社会责任的意愿和水平;董责险引入的时间越长,企业履行社会责任的意愿和水平越高;投保董责险的责任限额越高,企业履行社会责任的意愿和水平也越高;上述结论在一系列稳健性检验和内生性处理之后依然成立.机制分析发现,董责险通过吸引具有海外经历背景的优秀人才加盟董事会而促进了企业社会责任承担.鉴于董责险已经成为当前资本市场的重要市场化治理工具,建议监管机构积极推广董责险,以此完善公司治理,督促上市公司积极履行社会责任.
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance:A Catalyst for Corporate Social Responsibility or a Path to Opportunism
This study draws on data from firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2006 to 2020 to explore the impact of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance)on corporate social responsibility(CSR)endeavors and its underlying mecha-nisms.The empirical evidence underscores a notable bolstering of CSR commitment within firms implementing D&O insurance.Moreover,a direct correlation emerges between the tenure of D&O insurance adoption and the depth of CSR commitment;similarly,a positive association is discerni-ble between the liability cap of the D&O insurance and the extent of CSR commitment.Upon dis-secting the mechanisms at play,it becomes evident that D&O insurance fosters CSR commitment by luring top-tier talent with a background in international experience to the board of directors.As D&O insurance is increasingly recognized as a vital governance tool in the contemporary cap-ital markets,it is recommended that regulatory bodies enthusiastically endorse D&O insurance to bolster corporate governance and spur listed companies toward more robust engagement in social responsibilities.

D&O Insurancecorporate social responsibilitystakeholder theorysupervisory incentivesopportunism

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山东大学商学院

董责险 企业社会责任 利益相关者理论 监督激励 机会主义

国家社会科学基金一般项目

21BJY146

2024

金融经济学研究
广东金融学院

金融经济学研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:3.565
ISSN:1674-1625
年,卷(期):2024.39(2)
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