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城商行参与、地方政府救助与城投债违约风险化解

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地方政府的支持对于降低城投债违约风险具有重要意义.基于2015-2021年城投债地级市数据,采用OLS估计和工具变量法,分析城商行资源对城投债信用利差的影响.研究表明,地区金融资源和地方政府可支配金融资源能够显著降低当地城投债违约风险.异质性分析表明,城商行对城投债违约风险的降低效应仅在经济较发达和城商行资产富裕的地区存在.机制分析表明,第一例城投债的实质性违约强化了城商行资源对信用利差的降低效应,金融资源结构的"本地化"倾向对信用利差呈"倒U型"状态,城商行资源在降低城投风险方面具有财政金融二重属性.基于此,建议重视地区城商行建设,提升地方政府紧急救助能力,防止出现隐性债务"由点到面"的违约风险扩大化.
Participation of City Commercial Banks,Local Government Bailouts,and Mitigation of Default Risk in Municipal Investment Bonds
Support from local governments is crucial for reducing the default risk associated with municipal investment bonds.Utilizing data from municipal investment bonds in prefecture-level cities from 2015 to 2021,this study employed ordinary least squares(OLS)estimation and instrumental variable methods to analyze the impact of city commercial bank resources on the credit spreads of municipal investment bonds.The main regression results indicate that regional fi-nancial resources and the local government's disposable financial resources significantly reduce the default risk of local municipal investment bonds.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the effect of city commercial banks in reducing default risk is only present in economically developed areas and regions in which these banks are financially robust.The mechanism analysis demonstrates that the first substantial default of a municipal investment bond enhances the effect of city com-mercial bank resources on reducing credit spreads.The structure of financial resources shows a"localized"tendency,presenting an"inverted U-shaped"relationship with credit spreads,and city commercial bank resources exhibit dual financial and fiscal characteristics in reducing munic-ipal investment risk.Based on these findings,it is recommended to focus on the development of regional city commercial banks and enhance local governments'emergency bailout capabilities to prevent the escalation of implicit debt default risks from isolated incidents to broader crises.

credit spreaddefault riskfinancial resourceslocal government bailoutsmunici-pal investment bonds

孙征、胡志浩、李慧

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中国社会科学院大学

中国社会科学院金融研究所

城投债 违约风险 金融资源 信用利差 地方政府救助

2024

金融经济学研究
广东金融学院

金融经济学研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:3.565
ISSN:1674-1625
年,卷(期):2024.39(5)
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