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功能主义视野下的董事勤勉义务

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董事勤勉义务是一个抽象概念,要求董事在执行职务时做到善意、认真、尽职.为了引导董事做到勤勉尽责,新修订的《公司法》列明董事的勤勉义务,并规定董事执行职务时应当达到一般勤勉标准.但让董事概括承受违反勤勉义务所造成的公司损失,系漠视公司关系复杂性,将产生寒蝉效应或驱离效应,并可能会对经济发展产生一定影响.鉴于此,《公司法》的解释论应进一步明晰董事的行为标准,法官应尊重勤勉义务的一般行为标准,并在个案审判中保持适度宽容,逐渐发展一套合乎商业逻辑的司法审查标准.一个良好的董事勤勉义务体系,应当接纳行为标准和审查标准的二元结构,尊重不同董事之间的功能差异,公司应当概括承受董事履职风险,董事仅在限定条件下承担赔偿责任.
Directors'Duty of Diligence from a Functionalist Perspective
The newly revised Company Law provides for the first time that"directors shall act in the best interest of the company,and exercise reasonable care that administrators would ordinarily be required to exercise in the course of performing their duties."Nevertheless,it remains unclear as to how directors should perform their duty of diligence and what liabilities they should bear for breach of duty,which have become contentious issues in theory and prac-tice.The mainstream view is that the director's liability is tortious in nature.However,it should be noted that,in the system of"tort liability"established by the Chinese Civil Code,there is no mention of the constituent elements of a tort committed by a director.The director's liability must be heavier if imposed according to the general law,which undermines directors'initiative to perform their duties.It is submitted in this article that the duty of diligence is an abstract duty,so the content of the duty and the determinants of its breach vary among different types of directors based on their different"roles".The recognition of this idea is demonstrated by the usage of terms like"performing duties"and"administrator"in the newly revised Compa-ny Law.Based on the provisions of the Company Law and their implementation,directors are divided into three categories.Specifically,the first category comprises executive directors and chairmen of board acting as the corporate representatives and therefore becoming the sole per-sons representing the company externally.The second category refers to managing directors who are responsible for administering the company's affairs,including directors acting as adminis-trators or directors in charge of a specific business of the company.The third category consists of external directors and independent directors,who have no right to administer the company's affairs internally or to represent the company externally and mainly perform their roles by way of attending meetings of the board of directors and so on.The contents of directors'duty of dili-gence differ,as directors have different"roles".It is also submitted in this article that the pro-vision on directors'duty of diligence in the Company Law has two purposes.First,to provide a set of standards of behavior for directors to follow in the course of performing their duties,so as to ensure that they exercise reasonable care as administrators.Second,to equip judges with a set of grounds for properly adjudicating cases according to case facts and legal provisions.When directors violate the corresponding standard of behavior,the company is entitled to remove them from office,but not necessarily entitled to trigger their compensatory liability.When judges de-cide whether to make a defendant director liable for compensation,they ought to consider the particular role taken by the director,as well as the existence and the degree of fault.A director bears compensatory liability only in the case of gross negligence and he can rely on the"busi-ness judgment rule"to escape from such liability.

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中国人民大学法学院

董事勤勉义务 董事功能 行为标准 审查标准 赔偿责任

2022年度教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目

22JJD820018

2024

环球法律评论
中国社会科学院法学研究所

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CSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.188
ISSN:1009-6728
年,卷(期):2024.46(1)
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