Capital Regulation,Labor Allocation,and Within-firm Wage Inequality:Evidence from the Reform of Anti-monopoly Enforcement Agencies
In the context of the new era,capital regulation and guidance are of great significance in optimizing the distribution pattern of national income.With the reform of anti-monopoly en-forcement agencies in 2018 as a policy shock,this paper investigates the impact of capital regula-tion on within-firm wage inequality based on a difference-in-differences(DID)method.The re-sults show that capital regulation strengthens anti-monopoly regulatory power and enforcement ef-forts and has a significant improvement effect on within-firm wage inequality,which is equivalent to a 10.76％reduction on the average before the reform.The mechanism test suggests that in response to the strict regulation of the anti-monopoly enforcement on capital,firms are forced to optimize the structure of labor allocation and improve the efficiency of labor allocation,which re-duces the within-firm wage inequality.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the impact of capital regulation on wage inequality is larger among non-SOEs,firms located in regions with higher market segmentation,and firms with greater income inequality.
capital regulationwage inequalitylabor allocationanti-monopoly enforcement
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