首页|分权视角下地方政府债务风险防范的中国实践和国际经验

分权视角下地方政府债务风险防范的中国实践和国际经验

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中国式分权在促进经济发展,助推我国经济增长奇迹的同时,也面临分权体系不健全、结构不平衡等问题,成为推动地方政府债务及其风险形成的制度性因素。本文首先系统地总结了我国财政分权和金融分权的研究脉络和改革变迁,阐释了财政分权和金融分权的基本原理。其次,基于财政分权和金融分权两个维度剖析了地方政府债务及其风险的形成机制,提出了相关的研究假设,并利用相关数据进行了实证检验。同时,选取美国、法国、日本、澳大利亚等发达国家,探讨其分权制度下地方政府债务管理的先进经验。最后,基于当前我国经济发展现实,在辩证吸收国外经验基础上,提出分权视角下地方政府债务风险防范和监管的相关建议。
Chinese Practice and International Experience in Preventing Local Government Debt Risks from a Decentralized Perspective
Chinese-style decentralization not only contributed to China's economic development and boosted significant economic growth,but also faced problems such as an incomplete decentralization system and imbalanced structure,which have become an institutional factor in the formation of local government and local government debt risks.This article systematically summarizes the research context and reform changes of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization in China,and explains the logic behind the generation of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization.Subsequently,based on the dimensions of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization,this article analyses the formation mechanism of lo-cal government debt risk and proposes the relevant research hypotheses,with empirical tests were conduc-ted using relevant data.Additionally,advanced experience in local government debt management under the decentralization system of developed countries such as the United States,France,Japan,and Austral-ia was explored.Finally,based on the current economic development reality in China,on the basis of di-alectical reference to foreign experience,this article proposes suggestions for preventing and regulating lo-cal government debt risks from a decentralized perspective.

Fiscal decentralizationFinancial decentralizationDebt leverageSynergistic effectsRisk supervision

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中华人民共和国审计署审计科研所,北京 100086

财政分权 金融分权 债务杠杆 协同作用 风险监管

国家社会科学基金青年项目

19CJY054

2024

经济问题探索
云南省发展和改革委员会

经济问题探索

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.076
ISSN:1006-2912
年,卷(期):2024.(3)
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