首页|数字平台跨市场自我优待的反竞争效应——以搜索引擎平台为例

数字平台跨市场自我优待的反竞争效应——以搜索引擎平台为例

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自我优待是数字平台跨市场扩张的重要形式.数字平台的自我优待并非本身违法,分析数字平台自我优待是否违法,应重点考虑实施自我优待的平台是否具有市场支配地位,被优待市场经营者对实施自我优待平台的依赖程度,以及自我优待行为是否损害了竞争.根据上述分析要素,本文对搜索引擎平台自我优待行为和可能产生的反竞争效应进行案例研究.据此提出了完善我国反垄断立法和执法的政策建议.
The Anti-competitive Effect of Digital Platforms'Cross-market Self-preference--Take Search Engine Platform as an Example
Self-preference is an important form of cross-market expansion for digital platforms.The self-preference of digital platforms itself is not illegal.When analyzing whether the self-preference of digital platforms is illegal,we should focus on whether the platform implementing self-preference has dominant market position,the dependence of the favored market on the platform implementing self-preference,and whether the self-preference harms competition.Based on the above analytical el-ements,this paper conducts a case study on the self-preferential behavior of search engine platforms and the possible anti-competitive effects,according to which it puts forward policy recommendations to improve China's anti-monopoly legislation and law enforcement.

Digital PlatformSelf-PreferenceDominant Market PositionAnti-Competitive EffectCompetition Policy

于左、李思明

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东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心、东北财经大学数字经济研究院

东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心

数字平台 自我优待 市场支配地位 反竞争效应 竞争政策

2024

经济学家
西南财经大学 四川社会科学学术基金会(新知研究院)

经济学家

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:2.594
ISSN:1003-5656
年,卷(期):2024.(2)
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