Does ESG Performance Inhibit Corporate Excessive Financialization?
Guiding enterprises to moderately allocate financial assets and injecting capital into the real economy is of great practical significance for China to achieve high-quality economic development and promote Chinese modernization.However,the phenomenon of enterprises shifting from real to virtual is still prevalent.Thus,this paper takes A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2021 as research samples,explores the inhibiting factors of the problem of enterprises shifting from real to virtual,and examines the specific impact of ESG performance on corporate excessive financialization and its mechanism.The findings are as follows.First,ESG performance plays a crucial role in restraining corporate excessive financialization.Second,improving corporate information transparency is an important mechanism in this restraining process.Third,both external financialization supervision and managerial self-interest weaken the restraining effect.Fourth,this restraining effect is more evident in enterprises located in the eastern region,private enterprises,and enterprises where executives lack a finance background.This paper provides valuable insights for governments to formulate effective policies and enterprises to develop ESG development strategies.For the government,it needs to accelerate the construction and improvement of ESG information disclosure systems in line with China's national conditions and combine ESG soft supervision with local government financial hard supervision to effectively guide enterprises to rationally allocate their financial assets.For enterprises,the concept of ESG should be regarded as the strategic choice of enterprise development,and corporate excessive financialization should be restrained by the soft supervision effect,and enterprises should be guided to gradually shift from virtual to real and rationally allocate their own assets,and finally achieve high-quality development.The contributions of this paper are threefold.First,it explores the theoretical transmission framework and the main mechanism of ESG and corporate excessive financialization,enriching the traditional research framework of corporate financialization.It also verifies the resource allocation effect under the guidance of sustainable development of ESG,expanding the research on the value effect of ESG.Second,it further discusses the interaction between external financial supervision and internal managerial self-interest on ESG performance and corporate excessive financialization,which has practical significance for improving the government financial supervision system and optimizing corporate internal governance structure.Third,it provides new inspiration for re-understanding the heterogeneity of enterprises shifting from real to virtual,enterprises'reasonable allocation of financial assets,and for the government to properly supervise corporate financialization.
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