Evolutionary game mechanism of mandatory lane changing for exiting for intelligent connected bus
To relieve the conflicts between the intelligent connected bus and the social vehicle in the mandatory lane changing for bus exiting,the evolutionary game mechanisms for their behavioral decision-makings are analyzed.Two scenarios where the social vehicles are human-driven and intelligent connected are considered.The utility functions in different strategy profiles of the evolutionary game are formulated from the perspectives of safety utility,time utility and energy-saving utility.On this basis,the replicator dynamics equations for the two scenarios are constructed.According to the determinant and trace of Jacobi matrix in the dynamic game system,the equilibrium points and their stability in different situations are analyzed deeply.The sensitivity of evolutionary results to the difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies is explored.The results reveal that:the possible evolutionary directions in the dynamic game system involve"intelligent connected buses changing lanes,and social vehicles giving way","intelligent connected buses not changing lanes,and social vehicles not giving way",and"intelligent connected buses not changing lanes,and social vehicles giving way".From the perspective of overall optimization,adjusting the relevant variables of the safety and time utility of social vehicles can ensure the safety and efficiency of more vehicles in the process of mandatory lane changing of intelligent connected bus.The energy-saving utility promotes the strategy profile of changing lanes and giving way,and inhibits the strategy profile of not changing lanes and not giving way.
traffic engineeringintelligent connected busmandatory lane changingevolutionary gamebehavioral decision-making
万方数据
维普
