基层环保官员避责的行为表现、生成逻辑及其治理
The Behavioral Performance,Generative Logic and Governance of Grassroots Environmental Protection Officials'Blame Avoidance Behavior
唐斌 1彭媛2
作者信息
- 1. 湘潭大学公共管理学院,湖南湘潭 411105
- 2. 湖南警察学院管理系,湖南长沙 410138
- 折叠
摘要
基层环保官员避责行为不仅降低了环境治理效能,而且会消减环境体制改革成效.根据对A市生态环境机构垂直管理制度改革和S县生态环境治理实践的调查发现,基层环保官员的避责行为可以总结为条件性避责、程序性避责和分摊性避责等,结合已有文献研究,从宏观结构、中观禀赋以及微观心理三个维度构建分析框架,剖析基层环保官员避责行为的生成逻辑,并从弥合结构张力、强化组织禀赋、消解避责动机等方面提出治理避责行为的具体策略.
Abstract
The blame avoidance behavior of grassroots environmental protection officials not only reduces the effectiveness of environmental governance,but also diminishes the effectiveness of environmental institutional reform.According to the investigation on the reform of vertical management system of ecological and environmental institutions in City A and the practice of ecological and environmental governance in County S,blame avoidance behaviors of grassroots environmental protection officials can be categorized as conditional avoidance,procedural avoidance and apportionment avoidance etc.Combined with the existing literature,an analytical framework is constructed from three dimensions:macro-structural,meso-endowment and micro-psychological,to analyze the generative logic of grassroots environmental protection officials'avoidance behaviors,and to put forward specific strategies for managing the blame avoidance behaviors in terms of bridging structural tensions,reinforcing organizational endowment,and dissolving avoidance motives.
关键词
基层环保官员/避责行为/生成逻辑/治理Key words
grassroots environmental protection officials/blame avoidance behavior/generative logic/governance引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据