The January 28th Incident was a pivotal move in Japan's expansion of its war of aggression against China.However,Western powers,particularly Britain,exerted significant pressure on the Nationalist Government to abandon resistance in order to protect their own interests.Concurrently,certain high-ranking officials within the Kuomintang Regime lacked confidence in the prospects of resistance.Under the influence of a non-resistance policy,compromise diplomacy swiftly became the dominant approach for the Nationalist Government in handling the Janu-ary 28th Incident.Simultaneously,the Nationalist Government's understanding of Western powers'policies toward China was unclear,and its diplomatic decisions were heavily influenced by the shifting attitudes of Britain and the United States,oscillating between comprehensive settlements and localized mediation.More critically,regardless of Wang Jun's direct negotiations with Japan in Shanghai or indirect talks mediated by third-party nations,the Japanese military predominantly used peace negotiations as a tactical tool to advance its military objectives.In contrast,the Nationalist government prioritized compromise diplomacy and the containment of the conflict,which severely con-strained its ability to effectively counter Japanese aggression,leading to a rapid deterioration of the battlefield situa-tion.As a result,direct negotiations lacked a solid foundation,and third-party international mediation failed to pro-vide reliable diplomatic assurances.The minimal conditions for compromise were repeatedly undermined.This cha-otic and inconsistent approach to compromise diplomacy plunged the Nationalist Government's negotiations with Ja-pan into an insurmountable practical dilemma.
维普
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