Climate change has led to an increased frequency of agricultural catastrophes,significant-ly impacting farmers'incomes.Despite the rapid development of agricultural insurance in China during the"14th Five-Year Plan"period,numerous issues persist,such as insufficient payouts,low compensation intensity,and inadequate levels of protection.Based on evolutionary game theory,this study analyzes the disequilibrium in the agricultural catastrophe insurance market and proposes im-provement measures.In the model design,market equilibrium strategies and long-term equilibrium are combined,considering the roles of agricultural reinsurance companies and the government.Mat-lab simulations are utilized to analyze the decision-making behaviors of farmers and insurance com-panies.The study finds that the disequilibrium in the agricultural catastrophe insurance market is primarily influenced by factors such as information asymmetry,risk aversion,operational scale,and types of insurance products.Moreover,there are significant differences in the disequilibrium of poli-cy-oriented agricultural catastrophe insurance markets across different provinces.These findings provide theoretical insights for the design of agricultural insurance and reinsurance products and of-fer valuable references for improving the disequilibrium status of the agricultural catastrophe insur-ance market,thereby promoting the healthy development of the agricultural insurance market.
agricultural catastrophe insurancedisequilibriumevolutionary games
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