环境规制能促进制造业绿色创新吗?——基于动态博弈的理论分析与实证检验
Can Environmental Regulation Drive Green Manufacturing?A Theoretical and Empirical Study Based on Dynamic Game Theory
陈庆 1刘飞1
作者信息
- 1. 贵州大学 管理学院,贵州 贵阳 550025
- 折叠
摘要
运用动态博弈模型分析了强、弱环境规制背景下企业选择绿色制造的内在逻辑和外部条件,并结合中国32个省份和1092家制造业上市公司的样本数据构建固定效应面板门槛模型,实证检验了政府环境规制对企业绿色创新的门槛效应.研究发现:地方环境规制强度与制造企业绿色创新投入之间尽管存在着正相关关系,但同时也受到绿色产品溢价和绿色生产成本等因素的影响,换言之,政府环境规制强度与企业绿色创新投入之间的关系是非线性的且存在门槛效应.因此,地方政府在制定并实施环境规制政策时应尤其重视配套绿色奖补激励和保障绿色原材料供给,以及鼓励通过研发外包和技术转移提高制造企业绿色创新效能及效率,使企业尽早步入"绿色创新-绿色制造"的绿色循环发展新轨道.
Abstract
A dynamic game model was used to analyze the logic and conditions of firms'choice of green manufacturing under environmental regulations,and a fixed-effects panel threshold model was built with data from 32 provincial regions in China and 1092 manufacturing listed companies.This paper ex-amines the threshold effect of government environmental regulations on firms'green innovation.It is found that,influenced by green premiums and green costs,there is a positive relationship between re-gional environmental regulations and the development of local green manufacturing.However,this re-lationship is not linear but with a single threshold.Therefore,local governments should provide green subsidies and ensure the sustainability of green supply chain when formulating environmental regula-tions,while encouraging R&D outsourcing and technological transfer,for this would improve the ef-fectiveness and efficiency of green innovation in manufacturing industry,and help manufacturers a-chieve green transformation in a more rapid way.
关键词
环境规制/绿色制造/动态博弈/门槛效应Key words
Environmental Regulation/Green Manufacturing/Dynamic Game/Panel Threshold引用本文复制引用
基金项目
广东省软科学研究计划(2020A1010020060)
贵州省大学生创新创业训练计划(GZUSC2023039)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BDJ006)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据