基于系统动力学演化博弈的政府投资工程质量飞检率仿真
Simulation on Rate of Unannounced Inspection for the Government Investment Project Quality Based on SD Evolutionary Game Model
杨高升 1卢星云 1徐影1
作者信息
- 1. 河海大学商学院工程管理研究所,江苏南京 211100
- 折叠
摘要
为提高政府投资工程质量监管效率、降低道德风险,在提出质量飞检模式的基础上,将系统动力学(SD)和演化博弈动态复制理念相结合,针对飞检单位、承包商和监理单位的三方博弈行为建立SD演化博弈模型反映三方相互影响路径,并对最优飞检率进行仿真.分析表明:三方博弈不存在演化稳定均衡点;最优飞检率和飞检样本总量并无关联,且在该飞检率下承包商的履约程度可达最大值.最后从飞检时间的随机性和不备性、组织构成、内容等方面对质量飞检模式应用提出相应的管理提升建议.
Abstract
In order to improve the efficiency of quality supervision and reduce moral hazard for the government investment project,this paper establishes SD evolution game model among the unannounced inspection unit,contractor and supervising unit,combines system dynamics and evolutionary game dynamic replication concepts,to reflect the interaction path of three parties,and simulate the optimal detection rate. The analysis shows that,there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium point in tripartite game;the optimal unannounced inspection rate and the total number of samples are not correlated,and the con-tractor's performance can reach maximum under the rate. Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions for the applica-tion of quality unannounced inspection mode in the aspects of randomness and unreadiness of inspection time,organization composition and content.
关键词
质量监管/飞行检查频率/演化博弈理论/系统动力学/政府投资工程Key words
quality supervision/unannounced inspection rate/evolutionary game theory/system dynamics/government investment project引用本文复制引用
出版年
2018
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据