首页|基于动态博弈的科研诚信激励机制分析

基于动态博弈的科研诚信激励机制分析

扫码查看
为进一步激励和促进科研人员保持学术初心,减少各类学术不端现象的发生,通过建立科研活动主体、评议主体及科研诚信监督主体的动态博弈模型,从学术共同体参与科研诚信监督体系及对科研主体是否进行诚信激励两个维度出发,以最大化诚信率、最小化学术不端、最大化学术不端惩罚等 3 个目标为导向,系统性分析当前科研诚信体系激励机制,由此提出进一步完善相关奖惩机制设计以及推动科研诚信立法等对策建议.
Analysis on Incentive Mechanism of Scientific Integrity Based on Dynamic Game
How to further promote and motivate researchers to maintain their original academic intentions and reduce various kinds of academic misconduct.Through the establishment of dynamic game model including the subject of scientific research activity,the subject of review and the subject of scientific research credit supervision,starting from the two dimensions of the academic community participation in the scientific research integrity supervision system and the integrity incentive of the scientific research subject,we established three goal orientations:maximizing the integrity rate as the goal,minimizing the academic misconduct as the goal,and maximizing the punishment of academic misconduct as the goal and systematically analyzed the incentive mechanism of the current scientific research credit system.Therefore,this paper put forward countermeasures and suggestions to further improve the design of relevant reward and punishment mechanisms,and promote the legislation of scientific research integrity.

scientific research integrityincentive mechanismscientific research supervisiondynamic game

吴泽宇、李牧南

展开 >

华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510641

广东省创新方法与决策管理系统重点实验室,广东广州 510641

科研诚信 激励机制 科研监督 动态博弈

国家社会科学基金重点项目

22AZD035

2024

科技管理研究
广东省科学学与科技管理研究会

科技管理研究

CSTPCDCHSSCD
影响因子:0.779
ISSN:1000-7695
年,卷(期):2024.44(5)
  • 23