The Game Relationship and Decision-Making Evolution Mechanism Between the Government,Enterprises,and Consumers in the Disruptive Innovation
Disruptive innovation requires the collaborative involvement and deep cooperation of the government,enterprises,and consumers.Clarifying the game relationships and decision evolution mechanisms among these three parties is crucial for optimizing the environment for disruptive innovation and promoting enterprises to engage in such innovations.However,the existing disruptive innovation research mainly focuses on the technological breakthrough level,does not put the disruptive innovation in the real market environment,and generally ignores the key core element of consumers.According to this situation,based on the game theory,this paper constructs a tripartite game matrix involving the government,enterprises,and consumers,comprehensively considers the cooperative and competitive relationships among these parties,systematically analyzes their strategy choices and the equilibrium points of the game system,further discuss the three key variables,which as the total amount of increased government subsidies,the additional loss that enterprises misappropriating government subsidies for incremental innovation,the success probability of enterprise disruptive innovation,uses numerical simulations to illustrate the evolution process of the game strategies,examines the strategy choices,evolution trends,and stable conditions of different game participants in disruptive innovation.The result reveals that short-term,small-scale subsidies can stimulate enterprises to undertake disruptive innovation,whereas long-term,substantial subsidies may lead to dependency on public resources and increase speculative risks.The government has more room for trial and error in supporting disruptive innovation than enterprises do,but it also needs to bear the financial burden of subsidies.Consumer demand plays a decisive role in disruptive innovation,as products recognized by consumers can fundamentally influence enterprise decisions.Therefore,the government should cautiously assess the opportunities and risks of potential disruptive innovations,prioritize creating a favorable innovation environment,and fully leverage the decisive role of the market in disruptive innovation.
disruptive innovationinnovative decision-makinggame relationshipconsumer demandgovernment decision-makingdecision evolutionevolutionary gametripartite game
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