Dynamic Evolution and Influencing Factors of Multi-Agent Adoption Behavior of Disruptive Technologies:An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective
Based on the premises of bounded rationality and incomplete information,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model focusing on the adoption behavior of disruptive technologies by enterprises,consumers,and governments as the core agents.The model is used to analyze the stable strategies of the three parties in adopting disruptive technologies.Numerical simulation and verification of the model's specific evolutionary paths are conducted using MATLAB to explore the factors influencing the final strategy choices of the parties in the game process of adopting disruptive technologies.The results indicate that:(1)The initial attitudes and acceptance tendencies of enterprises,consumers,and governments towards disruptive technology products influence the evolutionary path and outcome of the game system;(2)For enterprises,a higher production proportion of disruptive technology products helps shorten the adoption cycle of disruptive technologies and increases the government's expectation of supporting the enterprises.For the government,subsidies for enterprises producing disruptive technology products extend the adoption cycle.If the subsidy is too large,the government may eventually abandon the subsidy.However,subsidies for consumers purchasing disruptive technology products show more significant effects in the early and middle stages of the adoption process compared to subsidies provided in the later stages.
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