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专利碎片化趋势下核心专利商业化策略的三方演化博弈

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基于专利价值理论,依据专利间的互补与依赖关系,对专利权人进行进一步划分,构建核心专利企业、障碍专利企业与政府监管部门间的三方演化博弈模型,并进一步通过MATLAB进行数值仿真分析,以探究不同条件下三方主体的策略演化规律.研究发现,不同主体的决策过程呈现不同特征,核心专利企业决策具备独立性,障碍专利企业决策需要经历学习与调整,政府决策具有稳定性;劫持许可超额收益、搜寻成本、侵权概率、行政处罚等因素对核心专利企业与障碍专利企业的决策存在差异性影响;政府决策主要受监管成本影响;同时,政府在核心专利商业化过程中处于主导地位,其决策直接影响着另外两方主体的策略组合,且受政府监管力度的影响较为强烈.
The Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Core Patent Commercialization Strategies Under the Trend of Patent Fragmentation
Based on the patent value theory,this paper further divides the patentees according to the complementarity and dependence between patents,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among core patent enterprises,barrier patent enterprises and government regulators,and further carries out numerical simulation analysis through MATLAB to explore the strategic evolution law of the three parties under different conditions.The results show that the decision-making process of different subjects presents different characteristics,the decision-making of core patent enterprises is independent,the decision-making of obstacle patent enterprises needs to undergo learning and adjustment,and the government decision-making is stable;The factors such as hijacking license excess return,search cost,infringement probability and administrative penalty have different effects on the decisions of core patent enterprises and barrier patent enterprises;Government decisions are mainly affected by regulatory costs;At the same time,the government is in a leading position in the process of commercialization of core patents,and its decision-making directly affects the strategic combination of the other two parties,and is strongly influenced by government regulation.

patent fragmentationpatent commercializationevolutionary game

岳翔宇、王国红、王瑜

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大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连 116024

专利碎片化 专利商业化 演化博弈

国家自然科学基金项目国家自然科学基金项目

7217403772002022

2024

科技管理研究
广东省科学学与科技管理研究会

科技管理研究

CSTPCDCHSSCD
影响因子:0.779
ISSN:1000-7695
年,卷(期):2024.44(13)