In order to better play the role of the state as an organizer of major scientific and technological innovation and improve the new national system under the socialist market economy,combined with the reality that the tasks of core technologies in key fields are urgent,the cycle is long,and the risk is high,the supervision and guidance party with the government as the main body will be integrated into the innovation ecosystem as an independent subject,and it will be given a new era connotation.From the perspective of the innovation ecosystem,this paper discusses and analyzes the roles and interests of various subjects,establishes a logical framework for interaction between subjects,and constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of knowledge suppliers,technology converters,supervisors,and users,which is based on knowledge and technology,linked by organizational supervision,centered on results transformation,and oriented to user needs.Under the assumption of bounded rationality,the stability of strategy selection of each game subject and the overall evolution trend of the system are analyzed from the perspective of interests.Through evolutionary game theory and differential theorem,possible system evolutionary stable points are found and stability analysis is conducted.At the same time,computer simulation is used to clarify the key factors affecting the stability of system evolution.Based on the simulation analysis of the system evolution trend and the influence of different initial strategy selection probabilities,the focus is on simulating the parameter influence involved in the supervision and guidance party with the government as the main body.The simulation experiment results show that the evolution trend and process of the system are consistent with the analysis conclusion,and all game players reach a steady state within a certain period;increasing the probability of initial strategy selection of knowledge suppliers,supervisors and guides,while reducing technology conversion and user demand will help speed up the evolution game and improve system stability;as far as the supervision and guidance parties are concerned,adopting regulatory strategies and reducing non-research expenditure costs will have a positive effect on system stability.However,increasing the intensity of policy rewards and punishments will intensify the volatility of the system evolution game and change the position of the system equilibrium point.This is because when it participates in innovation as an independent subject,increasing supervision will indirectly affect its own costs,and under the assumption of limited rationality,it will seek benefits and avoid harm and adjust its strategic choices.Although the problems can be solved under a strong regulatory state in the face of urgent critical tasks,but this approach is not sustainable.Therefore,in order to form a long-term and stable innovation ecosystem,it is recommended to introduce evaluation measures and make them an effective supplement to government supervision by improving evaluation and identification capabilities to support continuous scientific research output.
innovation ecosystemfour-party evolutionary gamekey core technologiesgovernment supervisionscientific and technological innovation
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