Can the Rotation of Chief Accountants Improve the Accounting Information Quality of State-Owned Enterprises?
How to improve the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and maintain the safety of state-owned assets through effective insti-tutional arrangements for state-owned assets supervision and administration is an important theoretical and practical question.This paper attempts to an-swer this question by taking the rotation of chief accountants in central SOEs as the starting point.It is found that the rotation of chief accountants can im-prove the accounting information quality in SOEs.Mechanism analyses indicate that the above result is weakened when the tenure of chief accountants is long or after the central SOEs carry out the pilot of building a standardized board or are audited by the National Audit Office.When further considering the types of rotation,the above result is only reflected when the chief accountants come from SOEs in the different industries or different cities or the chief ac-countants are promoted.Economic consequence analyses indicate that the rotation of chief accountants alleviates the problem of over-investments and ex-cess perks in SOEs by improving the accounting information quality.In summary,the rotation of chief accountants can enhance their independence and strengthen the financial management and supervision to improve the governance of SOEs and prevent the loss of state-owned assets.The research conclu-sion of this paper has important enlightenments for strengthening the supervision and maintaining the safety of state-owned assets under the background of deepening the reform of SOEs.
Chief AccountantsRotationIndependenceState-Owned EnterprisesFinancial Management and Supervision
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