Clawback provisions refer to the policy which allows firms to recoup compensation from corporate executives following certain specific e-vents.Using hand-collected data,this study examines the effect of clawback provisions in executive compensation contratcs on firm violations among Chi-nese listed firms from 2006 to 2020.We find that clawback provisions can effectively inhibit corporate violations.The results hold under a variety of endo-geneity tests and robustness tests.Furthermore,we find that the impact of clawback provisions on firm violations is pronounced in non-state owned enter-prises.We also find the impact of clawback provisions on firm violations is more significant in firms with weaker internal controls and firms in regions with better legal environments.This study sheds light on the critical role of clawback provisions in corporate governance and offers valuable insights for practice.
Clawback ProvisionsCorporate GovernanceCorporate ViolationsRisk Control
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
