CSRC's Supervision and Corporate Investment Efficiency——Based on the Random Inspection
The random inspection system is an important innovation of CSRC's supervision measure.Using this quasi-natural experiment conducted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission,we test the impact of random inspections on the investment efficiency of listed companies.The result shows that after the listed companies are randomly inspected,the investment efficiency is significantly improved.Further analyses show that the improvement of accounting information quality and internal governance are two important channels through which random inspection affects investment efficiency of listed companies.We also find that the effect is much stronger in the group with low level of internal control and poor legal environment.Lastly,we find that sec-ondary random inspection can significantly strengthen the positive correlation between random inspection and investment efficiency.The conclusions sup-port the positive significance of the innovative measures of CSRC's supervision to the high-quality development of economy.
Random Inspection SystemInvestment EfficiencyAccounting Information QualityCorporate Governance
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