Downstream Industrial Policy and Customer Information Disclosure:Evidence from Industrial Policy Spillover Effect
This paper examines the impact of industrial policy support for downstream industries on customer information disclosure strategies.We find that,firstly,firms are more likely to disclose customer information and to be more specific when the downstream industry is supported by industrial policies.Further,the effects of"entering"and"exiting"industrial policy lists in downstream industries are asymmetric:"entering"significantly increa-ses customer disclosure,but"exiting"does not decrease customer disclosure.Secondly,when downstream industries are supported by industrial policies,firms provide more optimistic performance forecasts and a more positive tone of customer information in annual reports.Thirdly,disclosure of customer in-formation further reduces the firms'cost of equity when the downstream industry is supported by industrial policy.The study suggests that firms actively disclose customer information with the help of favorable policies to release favorable signals and reduce financing costs.This study provides new evidence on the externalities of industrial policy in the supply chain and sheds light on the market's interpretation of firms'voluntary disclosure strategies.
Industrial PolicyDownstream IndustriesCustomer Information Disclosure