Does the Random Inspection Reduce Audit Opinion Shopping?
Since 2016,the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)has randomly selected two accounting firms every year to inspect their works in integrated management of branches and internal quality control(the Random Inspection,RI).Using the staggered inspection work from 2016 to 2018,we construct a generalized DID model to investigate the effect of RI on audit opinion shopping,and find evidence supporting that RI reduces the possibility of accounting firms engaging in the opinion shopping.The effect is more pronounced for accounting firms punished after RI,and among the practice of non-big-10 accounting firms.Furthermore,we find stronger effects of RI among audit offices'practice and audit offices with limited CPAs,which are consistent with the contents of RI.We also provide evidence of increasing audit independence and audit quality.Overall,we enrich the empirical evidence of opinion shopping from the perspective of audit supervision.
Random InspectionAudit Opinion ShoppingAudit Independence
万方数据
维普
