首页|政府采购与公司避税:政治压力还是监督治理?

政府采购与公司避税:政治压力还是监督治理?

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政府采购流程自身所伴生的监督治理作用是否会抑制供应商的避税行为呢(即"监督治理假说")?基于此,本文以2015-2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究发现获得政府采购的公司,无论政府采购金额大小,都会减少避税.而且,公开招标的采购以及单独中标的供应商更会减少避税.机制分析发现,政府采购通过提升公司的内部治理水平和外部监督强度发挥了对公司避税的监督治理作用.本文的发现拓展了政府采购与公司避税领域的研究,为完善政府采购制度提供了直接的经验证据.
Government Procurement and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Political Pressure or Supervisory Governance?
Does the supervision and governance role inherent in the government procurement process inhibit suppliers'tax avoidance activities(i.e.,the"supervisory governance hypothesis")?Based on a sample of A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019,this study finds that companies re-ceiving government procurement contracts tend to reduce tax avoidance,regardless of the procurement amount.Moreover,the negative impact of govem-ment procurement on tax avoidance is more pronounced in cases where procurement is conducted through public bidding and for suppliers who win con-tracts individually.Mechanism analysis reveals that government procurement plays a supervisory and governance role in corporate tax avoidance by enhan-cing internal corporate governance and strengthening external oversight.These findings extend the research on government procurement and corporate tax a-voidance,providing direct empirical evidence for improving government procurement systems.

Government ProcurementCorporate Tax AvoidanceSupervisory Governance HypothesisPolitical Cost Hypothesis

刘启亮、田志凡、陈冬、高尚

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江西财经大学会计学院 330013

华中科技大学管理学院 430074

武汉大学经济与管理学院 430072

政府采购 避税 监督治理假说 政治成本假说

国家自然科学基金面上项目国家自然科学基金面上项目教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目

717721397237206122YJA790004

2024

会计研究
中国会计学会

会计研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:6.346
ISSN:1003-2886
年,卷(期):2024.(6)