The Downside of Absence of Controlling Owners——Empirical Evidence from Managerial Stock Trading Profitability
Using the listed company to announce the absence of controlling shareholders,this article analyzes the impact of absence of controlling shareholders on the excess return of managerial stock trading from the perspective of rent-seeking.This paper finds that when there is no controlling share-holder,it will lead to more serious managerial trading excess return;In the path analysis,this paper finds that absence of controlling shareholders will aggravate information asymmetry,and"information effect"is an important way to affect the abnormal return of managerial stock trading;absence of con-trolling shareholders will also increase equity incentives,and"equity incentives"is also an important way to affect the abnormal return of managerial trading.In cross-sectional analysis,this paper finds that high equity concentration,high analyst attention and high financial development can alleviate managerial rent-seeking and reduce stock trading excess returns.The research in this paper shows that when there is no controlling shareholder,although the second type of agent conflict will disappear,it will also lead to a more serious first type agent conflict.
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维普
