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政府审计监督与企业并购行为

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在企业外部环境中,政府审计是一项独特监督机制,高质量审计有助于促进企业高质量发展.自2010年以来,审计署多次在公告中揭示企业并购相关问题.本文以2008-2018年沪深A股中央企业控股上市公司为样本,使用双重差分法考察了政府审计监督对企业并购行为的影响.研究发现:政府审计监督降低了企业的并购次数和并购规模.进一步研究显示,在法律风险更高、融资约束更高的企业中,政府审计发挥的监督作用更强;政府审计监督能够影响并购溢价水平和并购支付方式;并且政府审计监督显著提高了企业并购的短期绩效和长期绩效.本文的研究发现为政府审计推动企业科学决策发挥治理效应提供了微观证据,对促进我国政府审计作用的发挥以及企业并购绩效的提升具有启发意义.
Government Audit Supervision and Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions
In the external environment of enterprises,government audit serves as a unique supervision mechanism aimed at promoting high-quality development through effective audit supervision.Since 2010,the National Audit Office of China has repeatedly highlighted issues related to enterprise mer-gers and acquisitions in its announcements.This article focuses on A-share listed companies controlled by central state-owned enterprises during 2008-2018 and establishes a difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of government audit supervision on enterprise M&As.We find that govem-ment audit supervision reduces the number and scale of M&As.Further research shows that government audit has a more significant impact in enterprises facing higher legal risks and financing constraints.Additionally,government audits supervision can reduce enterprises'M&A premiums and affect payment methods.Moreover,government audit supervision significantly improves the short-term and long-term performance of M&As.The results provide empirical evidence for the governance effect of government audit on informed decision-making within enterprises.Furthermore,these findings are significant in shed-ding light on the role of government audit in China and enhancing the performance of enterprise M&As.

Government Audit SupervisionMergers and AcquisitionsCentral EnterprisesGovernance Effect

梁上坤、薛慰至、林楠

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中央财经大学会计学院 100081

福州外语外贸学院金融学院 350202

政府审计监督 并购行为 中央企业 治理效应

国家自然科学基金面上项目国家自然科学基金面上项目国家社会科学基金重大项目国家社会科学基金重大项目

722721647187219621&ZD14519ZDA098

2024

会计研究
中国会计学会

会计研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:6.346
ISSN:1003-2886
年,卷(期):2024.(7)