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代工厂非法侵入市场的外包双渠道供应链决策

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为了降低外包双渠道供应链渠道冲突,以由品牌企业、代工厂、实体零售商和网上零售商组成的三级供应链系统作为研究对象,构建了两种不同供应链权力结构下的代工厂非法侵入市场四方定价博弈模型,并通过对四方定价博弈模型求解,研究当代工厂非法侵入市场时,外包双渠道供应链决策问题.研究结果表明:在两种供应链权力结构下,代工厂均会选择不遵守合同规定而侵入市场,品牌企业是否会对代工厂进行监督则取决于监督成本的大小;当满足一定约束条件时,代工厂非法侵入市场有利于增加品牌企业和实体零售商的利润;代工厂非法侵入市场的外包双渠道供应链选择何种权力结构取决于消费者对电子渠道产品接受度的大小.品牌企业和实体零售商合作降低产品的供应成本和销售成本是应对代工厂非法侵入市场风险,提高各方利润的关键.
Outsourcing Dual-Channel Supply Chain Decision-Making under Illegal Market Infiltration by Contract Manufacturers
To reduce channel conflicts in the outsourcing dual-channel supply chain,this paper takes a three-echelon supply chain system composed of a brand enterprise,a contract manufacturer,a physical retailer,and an online retailer as the research object.Two different supply chain power structure models of the contract manufacturer's illegal market encroachment and a four-party pricing game model are constructed.By solving the four-party pricing game model,the outsourcing dual-channel supply chain decision-making problem is stud-ied when the contract manufacturer illegally infiltrates the market.The research results show that under both sup-ply chain power structures,the contract manufacturer will choose to violate the contract and infiltrate the market.Whether the brand enterprise will supervise the contract manufacturer depends on the cost of supervision.When certain constraints are met,the contract manufacturer's illegal market encroachment can increase the profits of the brand enterprise and the physical retailer.The choice of power structure in the outsourcing dual-channel supply chain where the contract manufacturer illegally infiltrates the market depends on the degree of consumer accept-ance of electronic channel products.Cooperation between the brand enterprise and the physical retailer to reduce product supply costs and sales costs is key to addressing the risks of the contract manufacturer's illegal market en-croachment and increasing profits for all parties.

illegal market infiltration by contract manufacturersoutsourcing supply chaindual-channel supply chainfour party pricing game

余利娥

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淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北 235000

代工厂非法侵入市场 外包供应链 双渠道供应链 四方定价博弈

2024

昆明理工大学学报(自然科学版)
昆明理工大学

昆明理工大学学报(自然科学版)

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.516
ISSN:1007-855X
年,卷(期):2024.49(6)