概念内容的客观性问题及一种融贯论的辩护——从布兰顿的概念内容理论看
The Problem of Objectivity of Conceptual Content and a Defense Based on a Coherence Theory——From the Perspective of Brandom's Theory of Conceptual Content
武庆荣1
作者信息
- 1. 淮阴师范学院公共管理学院,江苏淮安 223001;南京大学现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所,南京 210093
- 折叠
摘要
布兰顿的概念内容理论诉诸"推理"诠释概念内容,主张概念内容是其推理作用,但这种语义策略面临一大难题,即如何根据社会的和推理的阐明解释概念内容的客观性.针对此问题,布兰顿主要提供了一种表达主义的解决方案.尽管这一方案及其理论基底受到了福多、莱文等的挑战,但在布兰顿的理论语境中,它有一定的合理性;不仅如此,诉诸塞拉斯式的解释性的融贯论,也可以为这种表达主义的解决方案提供一定程度的辩护.
Abstract
Brandom's theory of conceptual content appeals to"inference"to interpret conceptual content,and ar-gues that conceptual content is its inferential role.But the semantic strategy faces a big problem,that is,how to explain the objectivity of conceptual content in terms of social and inferential articulation.Brandom mainly offers an expressivist solution to the problem.Although the solution and its theoretical foundation have been challenged by Fodor,Levine,et al.,it has certain rationality in Brandon's theoretical context.Not only that,resorting to a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory can also provide a certain degree of defense for the expressivist solution.
关键词
布兰顿/概念内容/客观性问题/解释性的融贯论Key words
Brandom/conceptual content/the problem of objectivity/explanatory coherence theory引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社科基金后期资助项目(19FZXB038)
江苏省社科基金项目(21ZXB006)
江苏省教育科学"十四五"规划2021年度重点课题(B/2021/01/75)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据