论推论主义语义学的组合性难题
On the Compositionality Problem of Inferential Semantics
戴益斌1
作者信息
摘要
福多和勒珀尔认为,意义是组合性的,但推论作用不是组合性的.因此,意义不可能是推论作用.布兰顿试图通过利用替换推论解释推论作用具有组合性的特点,佩雷格林则试图通过区分两种不同的组合性规避推论主义的组合性难题.论证表明,布兰顿和佩雷格林的尝试并不成功.对于推论主义来说,放弃意义具有组合性这一论点是一个更好的方案.而且,我们有理由支持推论主义者选择这一方案.
Abstract
According to Fodor and Lepore,meaning is compositional,but the inferential role is not,therefore,meaning cannot be the inferential role.Brandom tries to explain the compositional feature of inferential role by sub-stitution inferences,and Peregrin tries to avoid the compositionality problem of inferentialism by distinguishing two different kinds of compositionality.Our arguments show that Brandom's and Peregrin's attempts are not success-ful.It would be better for inferentialism to abandon the idea that meaning is compositional.Moreover,there are many reasons to support this strategy.
关键词
意义/推论作用/组合性Key words
meaning/inferential role/compositionality引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目(20CZX046)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(20&ZD046)
出版年
2024