现象溢出与意识的分离主义
Phenomenal Overflow and Separatism of Consciousness
王振华1
作者信息
- 1. 山东大学哲学与社会发展学院,济南 250013
- 折叠
摘要
现象意识与取用意识在经验上是否可分离?现象溢出命题认为现象意识内容超出了取用意识容量,所以它们有着不同的神经实现,从而支持了分离主义;现象稀疏命题则认为可以通过对盲视、注意与错觉的解释消解了溢出命题,意识本质上其实是稀疏的,因此,它支持了反分离主义.文章认为,现象稀疏命题虽然拒绝承认溢出命题,但它所提供的论据并没有将其驳倒.相反,现象溢出是更为合理的,从而支持了分离主义.
Abstract
Is it possible to separate phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness experientially?The proposi-tion of phenomenal overflow suggests that the contents of phenomenal consciousness exceed the capacity of access consciousness,indicating that they have different neural implementations,thus supporting separatism.The proposi-tion of phenomenal sparse,on the other hand,argues that the overflow proposition can be resolved through explana-tions of blindsight,attention,and illusions,suggesting that consciousness is essentially sparse,thereby supporting anti-separatism.In my opinion,although the proposition of phenomenal sparse rejects the idea of overflow,its ar-guments do not refute it.On the contrary,phenomenal overflow seems more reasonable,thus supporting separa-tism.
关键词
现象意识/取用意识/现象溢出/现象稀疏/分离主义Key words
phenomenal consciousness/access consciousness/phenomenal overflow/phenomenal sparse/separa-tism引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AZX00)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据