Since Anscombe reintroduced practical knowledge into contemporary philosophy of action,philosophers usually focus on its practicality and the non-observational,without attention to the tension between the two charac-teristics.By analogy with the perceptual situation,I argue that this tension will lead to a skepticism about practical knowledge,i.e.,that we cannot really have practical knowledge of our own intentional actions.McDowell sugges-ted a possible extension of the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience to intentional action in response to the skepticism about practical knowledge,but there are many problems.I attempt to revise and develop McDowell's disjunctive scheme,arguing that as for practical knowledge,the criterion for distinguishing good and bad disjuncts should be shifted from"successful or not"to"apt or not"for intentional action,which will be a better way to re-spond to skepticism.
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