斯特根加对种群个体论的质疑和对种群多元论的辩护
Stegenga's Questioning of Population Individualism and Defense of Population Pluralism
肖显静 1张亚玲2
作者信息
- 1. 山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,太原 030006;华南师范大学科学技术与社会研究院,广州 510006
- 2. 山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,太原 030006
- 折叠
摘要
斯特根加认为米尔斯坦提出的因果相互作用者种群定义存在模糊性、无效性和过度限制性的问题,并进一步认为其种群个体论是不成立的.米尔斯坦对此给予回应,认为斯特根加的质疑没有道理.斯特根加继而对种群个体论展开了进一步的批判,认为米尔斯坦因果相互作用者种群概念所代表的狭义种群定义,面临无数概念上的困难和反例,因果相互作用在认识论上是不可能的.在提出种群多元论的基础上,斯特根加通过回应米尔斯坦对种群多元论不一致使用、事实不确定和划界负担的质疑,以及分析进化论中关于自然选择的相关争论,进一步为他的种群多元论辩护.斯特根加的种群多元论有一定合理性,种群一元论也不无道理,应该在两者之间保持必要的张力.
Abstract
Stegenga argues that the causal interactionist population definition proposed by Millstein suffers from am-biguity,invalidity,and over-restrictiveness,and further believes that her population individualism is not valid.Millstein responds to this by arguing that Stegenga's challenge is unwarranted.Stegenga goes on to develop a fur-ther critique of population individualism,arguing that the narrow definitions of population represented by Millstein's causal interactionist population concept faces numerous conceptual difficulties and counter-examples,and that causal interactions are epistemologically impossible.On the basis of proposing population pluralism,Stegenga fur-ther defends his population pluralism by responding to Millstein's questioning of the inconsistent usage,factual in-determinacy and burden of demarcation of population pluralism,as well as analyzing the relevant debates on natural selection in evolution.While Stegenga's population pluralism has some rationality,population monism is also rea-sonable,so the necessary tension between the two should be maintained.
关键词
斯特根加/种群多元论/种群个体论/因果相互作用/实在论Key words
Stegenga/population pluralism/population individualism/causal interaction/realism引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金重大项目(16ZDA112)
教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助重大项目(22JHQ003)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据