Why the Pragmatic Defense of the Principle of Substitutivity Cannot Work
According to naive Referentialism,the semantic content of a proper name is its reference,and co-refer-ential proper names can substitute for each other in a sentence without changing its truth value.However,the prop-ositional attitude reports,in which co-referential proper names substitute for each other,are intuitively thought to have different truth values by ordinary language users.Many naive referentialists try to give a pragmatic defense.That is,such a pair of sentences implicate different information which is intuitively mistaken for the semantic con-tent of the sentences.This defense cannot work.Because the putative implicatures are related to the manner of ex-pression of the propositional attitude reports,they are either conversational implicatures based on a maxim of man-ner or conventional implicatures.In the former case,the required manner maxim cannot be found,whereas in the latter case they are unlikely to affect ordinary language users'judgments of the truth values of the sentences.
proper namethe Principle of Substitutivitypragmaticsconversational implicaturespropositional at-titude
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