科学技术哲学研究2024,Vol.41Issue(6) :52-58.

源于他人证言的道德知识

Moral Knowledge from Others'Testimony

王奇琦
科学技术哲学研究2024,Vol.41Issue(6) :52-58.

源于他人证言的道德知识

Moral Knowledge from Others'Testimony

王奇琦1
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作者信息

  • 1. 厦门大学马克思主义学院,福建厦门 361005;厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心,福建厦门 361005
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摘要

在日常生活中,人们默认彼此持有普遍的善恶是非观念,具备基本的道德认知能力.然而,道德知识的可能性和地位一直遭受怀疑论者的挑战和质疑.近期一种捍卫道德知识的思路是将道德证言与一般证言进行比较,这为论证道德知识的可能性提供了一个新的视角.对该思路的深入考察发现,其实质是证言知识的反还原论立场.这一立场存在一系列困难,例如难以处理道德分歧难题,以及难以解释道德专家的存在,并导致对道德知识范围的不当放大.克服这些弊端的方式在于引入置信度概念,发展道德证言的还原论,以彰显社会交往中的实践理性,避免道德认知中的盲从与轻信.

Abstract

In daily life,people believe others have general moral views and basic moral cognitive abilities.Howev-er,the possibility and status of moral knowledge have sparked widespread controversy in the field of moral episte-mology.Some scholars have recently argued that moral testimony is not fundamentally different from other forms of testimony,which presents a new perspective on the possibility of moral knowledge.The paper discovers that the view above is known as Anti-Reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Anti-reductionism of moral testimo-ny faces several challenges,such as addressing the issue of moral disagreement,explaining moral expertise,and mistakenly expanding the scope of moral knowledge.To address these challenges,the concept of credence is intro-duced,and a reductionist approach to moral testimony is developed.By doing so,we emphasize the importance of practical rationality in social interaction and avoid following others blindly and being irrationally gullible.

关键词

证言/道德证言/道德知识/道德知识论/知识论

Key words

testimony/moral testimony/moral knowledge/moral epistemology/epistemology

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出版年

2024
科学技术哲学研究
山西大学 山西省自然辩证法研究会

科学技术哲学研究

CSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.299
ISSN:1674-7062
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