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考虑研发补贴的政企协同创新双向政策调控路径

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从研发补贴与企业研发投入,研发补贴与企业获得的外部投资两个倒"U"型关系入手,构建地方政府和研发企业间的随机演化博弈模型,通过模型求解与计算机仿真,探讨随机干扰环境下两类主体的策略演化态势.针对地方政府和研发企业,从增强主体选择合作策略的稳定性和提升主体选择合作策略的速度两个政策调控路径着手,分析单变量调控和多变量协同调控的政策效力.结果表明:第一,上级政府在政策协同调控中,存在不同调控路径下的相同最优政策组合,且政策协同效果出现方向性差异,创新协同效应和企业新产品销售收入在两种调控路径中分别起到关键作用;第二,对研发企业的政策协同调控中,如果相关政策配套(即提高企业新产品销售额,降低企业税收税率,提高企业无补贴状态下获得外部投资额和政企创新协同效应),降低研发补贴反而会刺激企业研发的积极性,并减少企业的"背叛"行为.
The Dual Regulatory Paths of Collaborative Innovation between Local Governments and Enterprises from the Perspective of R&D Subsidy
The R&D process in enterprises is characterized by high risk and uncertainty regarding returns.Govern-ments often establish a series of R&D subsidy programs to encourage enterprise innovation.Currently,countries world-wide have introduced various R&D subsidy programs,such as the EU's"Horizon 2020"and the US's"CHIPS Act."However,there is still ongoing debate in the academic community regarding how R&D subsidies stimulate enterprise in-novation investment and help attract external investment.Some scholars have attempted to explain the impact of R&D sub-sidies at different stages using an"inverted U-shaped"relationship.This approach has provided a new perspective for re-search.This article takes the"inverted U-shaped"relationship as a starting point to analyze the issue of government-enter-prise collaborative innovation.This article first establishes the"inverted U-shaped"relationship function between enterprise R&D investment and government R&D subsidies,as well as the"inverted U-shaped"relationship function between enterprise external financing and government R&D subsidies.Based on the analysis of profit and loss variables,an evolutionary game model is con-structed.A random disturbance system is introduced to simulate external disturbances during the decision-making evolu-tion process.Additionally,by analyzing the existence and stability of equilibrium solutions,the article solves the condi-tions for a stable zero-moment equilibrium.With the help of MATLAB software,simulation analysis was conducted on the stochastic evolutionary game model.Regarding the coordinated regulation of local government policies,the article highlights that a policy combination that reduces R&D subsidies,increases enterprise sales of new products,enhances the synergy of government-enterprise in-novation,and reduces the probability of enterprises not conducting R&D can produce the most significant positive impact.However,it also reveals that even when each policy is regulated according to the expected direction,directional differences in the synergy effect of multiple policies still occur.Core variables play a crucial role in regulation,such as the role of in-novation synergy in enhancing the stability of subject selection for cooperative strategies and the role of government-enter-prise innovation synergy and the probability of R&D enterprise betrayal in the regulation path of increasing the speed of subject selection for cooperative strategies.For different regulation paths,the same variable combination for coordinated regulation can also lead to differences.Regarding the coordinated regulation of R&D enterprise policies,the article suggests that multi-policy coordination has a better regulatory effect on enterprises compared to regulation by local governments.Under the premise of relevant policy support,reducing R&D subsidies can stimulate enterprise R&D enthusiasm and reduce enterprise"betrayal"be-havior.Additionally,when promoting rapid participation of enterprises in innovation cooperation,higher-level govern-ments need to prevent redundant situations caused by policy issuance.On this basis,the article proposes some policy recommendations.When higher-level governments regulate local governments,they can appropriately encourage local governments to reduce R&D subsidies to ease financial pressure.However,at the same time,relevant measures should be introduced to increase enterprise sales revenue of new products,improve the performance of government-enterprise cooperation in in-novation,and enhance enterprise enthusiasm for R&D.Higher-level governments also need to be vigilant about the nega-tive effects brought about by some policy coordination regulations.The most typical example is the situation where"re-ducing subsidies"and"reducing taxes"are hastily promoted without other policy measures being introduced.If higher-level governments pursue regulatory stability,they should focus on improving the performance of government-enterprise cooperation in innovation,encourage enterprises to apply for local R&D subsidy projects,and carry out R&D activities around the needs of local industrial development.However,if the focus is on promoting the speed of government-enter-prise innovation cooperation,then the most important thing is to intensify the substantive R&D review for R&D enterprises after they receive subsidies.In addition,local governments often tend to subsidize short-term and high-visibility product development projects.Therefore,when subsidizing,higher-level governments should focus on long-term basic research and applied research projects,providing effective supplements to local governments.When higher-level governments regulate R&D enterprises,if the reduction of R&D subsidy levels is intended to reduce financial pressure,a series of measures should be introduced to increase enterprise sales revenue of new products,such as increasing subsidies for new products and reducing taxes.This will,in turn,stimulate enterprise R&D enthusiasm.Furthermore,if higher-level governments have already introduced relevant policies related to new product sales,govern-ment-enterprise cooperation,and enterprise R&D enthusiasm,there is no need to introduce other policy measures.When applying for local government subsidy projects,enterprises should focus on the effectiveness of project results,and the projects should be closer to the market end.

R&D subsidystochastic evolutionary gamepolicy coordinationpolicy effectiveness

李军强、汪明月

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上海财经大学上海发展研究院,上海 200433

中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院,北京 100190

研发补贴 随机演化博弈 政策协同 政策效力

国家自然科学基金青年基金项目中国博士后科学基金项目中国博士后科学基金项目2023年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目

722042472020M6704702023M73216923YJC630082

2024

科学学与科学技术管理
中国科学学与科技政策研究会 天津市科学学研究所

科学学与科学技术管理

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.68
ISSN:1002-0241
年,卷(期):2024.45(7)