Dual Path Mechanisms of Executive Reputation Driving Green Innovation:From Time Orientation and Signaling Perspectives
Under the new development pattern,promoting green and sustainable development is the primary prerequi-site for China to realize the goal of"carbon peak and carbon neutrality".The high-carbon emission attributes of the manu-facturing industry and its long-term sloppy development have exerted tremendous pressure on the environment.However,the problem of double externalities arising from green innovation spillovers may weaken firms'incentives to invest,and the fact that green innovation does not provide immediate economic benefits to firms makes external regulation an impor-tant determinant of green innovation.Existing studies exploring the antecedents of green innovation at the executive level mainly focused on the explicit and implicit attributes of executives,neglecting the green governance effect of executive in-centive contracts.The principal-agent problem caused by inconsistent interests and information asymmetry is a key con-straint to corporate green innovation.Exploring the construction of green innovation-oriented endogenous driving mecha-nism from the perspective of optimizing executive incentive contracts is a fundamental solution to achieve green transfor-mation and upgrading.Based on the principal-agent theory,we use the data of A-share listed companies in the manufacturing industry from 2007 to 2021 to explore the impact and the driving mechanisms of executive reputation contract on corporate green inno-vation and other contextual factors.The results show that:Firstly,executive reputation has a significant positive promo-tional effect on green innovation of enterprises in the manufacturing industry;Secondly,from the perspective of solving"time-based"agency problem and information asymmetry problem,executive reputation can restrain managerial myopia and opportunistic behavior,and then drives green innovation through the mediating mechanisms of shaping long-term orientation and improving information transparency.Further research finds that executive reputation can also significantly enhance the quality of corporate green innovation.Governmental behavioral factors such as low-carbon city pilot policies and government subsidies reinforce the promotional effect of executive reputation on green innovation,and the gover-nance effect of executive reputation is stronger in state-owned enterprises.This paper has important theoretical and practical implications.Firstly,it expands the application boundaries of the principal-agent theory in the field of green innovation,while enriching the research threshold of the governance effect of executive reputation.Secondly,we explore the internal drivers of corporate green innovation from the perspective of cor-porate governance,and expand the research horizon of antecedent variables of corporate green innovation.We investigate the role of reputation contract in shaping the long-term time orientation of executives through the"time lens",and by studying the unique signaling mechanism of reputation contract,we provide new perspectives to solve the principal-agent problems of interest divergence and information asymmetry.It opens the"black box"of the green governance effect of ex-ecutive reputation,and enriches the research on the intrinsic motivation mechanism of corporate green innovation from the level of executive incentives.Thirdly,we clarify the logical relationship between internal driving forces at the executive level and external constraints at the government regulation level,providing ideas for exploring the positive externalities of green technological innovation.It also provides a useful reference for the design of green innovation-oriented corporate governance mechanisms in practice.
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万方数据
