独知能避免自欺吗?——康德哲学视域下的儒家诚意说
Can Knowing-by-oneself(Duzhi)Avoid Self-deceptioin:On the Confucianism's Theory of Sincerity(Chengyi)from the Perspective of Kantian Ethics
蔡祥元1
作者信息
- 1. 中山大学哲学系(珠海) 广东 珠海519082
- 折叠
摘要
康德把自欺视作人性的根本恶,邓晓芒据此批评儒家伦理具有一种结构性伪善.邓晓芒论述了《论语》中的乡愿之论,但未就宋儒的自欺说展开讨论.朱子的独知之论就是针对一个人如何把握自己内心状态以避免自欺而提出的应对之道,它在学理上比《论语》的相关讨论更为细致.我们有必要接着邓晓芒的批评,透过康德的哲学视野,重新审视儒家的诚意工夫,尤其是朱子的独知之论,看它到底能不能克服自欺.
Abstract
Kant regarded self-deception as the radical evil of human nature,on basis of which Deng Xiaomang criticized Confucian ethics as structural hypocrisy.Deng Xiaomang discussed the hypocrites narrated in The Analects,but did not analyze the Neo-Confucianism's narration on self-deception.Zhu Xi's theory of knowing-by-oneself(Duzhi)is a response to how a person can control one's inner state to avoid self-deception,which is academically more detailed than the related discussion in The Analects.We need to follow Deng Xiaomang's criticism to re-examine the theory of sincerity of Confucianism,especially Zhu Xi's theory of knowing-by-oneself,from the perspective of Kant's ethics,to see whether it can overcome the moral dilemma of self-deception.
关键词
自欺欺人/诚意/独知Key words
Self-deception/Sincerity/Knowing-by-oneself引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
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