Anti-monopoly Regulation of Super Platform Killer Acquisitions
The killer acquisition of super platforms is a special case of business concentration under the platform business model that has or may have the effect of excluding and restricting competition effects.The current antitrust norms originate and adapt to the real economy.The regulatory dilemma facing the killer acquisition of super platforms can be mainly attributed to the limited scope of standards in pre-declaration,the interference of the illegality determination in the substantive review,and the lack of institutional environment for the application of the principle of inclusive prudence.To effectively regulate,it is necessary to apply compound indicators that fit the platform model,implement more proactive investigation systems and standard implementation evaluation systems,and build a comprehensive declaration system;eliminate the obstacles of substantive review through the typification and layered application of direct evidence law,the setting of discretionary benchmarks for identifying potential competitors,and the setting of restrictive conditions,and better implement the principle of inclusive prudence through the construction of responsive regulatory models and their accompanying institutional arrangements.
platform monopolykiller acquisitionsanti-monopoly lawthe principle of inclusive prudence
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维普
