首页|高管薪酬粘性如何影响企业技术创新——基于对A股上市公司数据的分析

高管薪酬粘性如何影响企业技术创新——基于对A股上市公司数据的分析

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技术创新作为新质生产力的重要体现,是推动企业可持续发展的不竭动力.文章选取2015-2022年A股上市公司的数据进行实证分析,研究发现:高管薪酬粘性在推动企业技术创新投入与产出方面具有显著的正效应,且在非国有企业和高技术行业更加显著;股权集中度在高管薪酬粘性与企业技术创新投入与产出间扮演着正向调节的角色;政府补助在高管薪酬粘性与企业技术创新产出间扮演着正向调节的角色.高管薪酬粘性作为一种"重奖轻罚、失败容忍"的薪酬激励制度,在一定程度上降低了高管在技术的创新过程中因担忧失败而可能产生的顾虑.通过减轻对失败后果的负面预期,薪酬粘性有助于激发高管持续创新的动力,推动企业技术创新能力进步.
How the Stickiness of Executive Compensation Affects Corporate Technological Innovation——an Analysis of A-share Listed Companies Data
Technological innovation,as an important manifestation of new quality productive forces,is an unending driving force for corporate sustainable development.The paper conducts empirical analysis on data of listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2022,and the research findings are as follows:the stickiness of executive compensation has a significant positive effect on the enterprise's technological innovation input and output,and the promotion of the stickiness of executive compensation on enterprise technological innovation is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech industries;the degree of shareholding concentration plays a positive moderating role between the stickiness of executive compensation and enterprise technological innovation input and output;government subsidies play a positive moderating role between the stickiness of executive compensation and enterprise technological innovation output.The stickiness of executive compensation,as a kind of compensation incentive system that"emphasizes rewards and light punishments and tolerates failure",to some extent reduces the concerns of senior executives in the process of technological innovation due to fear of failure.By alleviating the negative expectations of failure consequences,the stickiness of executive compensation helps to stimulate the continuous innovation drive of senior executives and promote the progress of the capacity of corporate technological innovation.

stickiness of executive compensationcorporate technological innovationshareholding concentrationgovernment subsidies

王关义、张梦辰

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广东外语外贸大学南国商学院,广东 广州 361021

北京印刷学院经济管理学院,北京 102600

高管薪酬粘性 企业技术创新 股权集中度 政府补助

2024

辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
辽宁大学

辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版)

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.497
ISSN:1002-3291
年,卷(期):2024.52(6)