我国高等教育质量保障体系中地方与中央政府权力博弈分析
The analysis on power game relationship between the central and the local authorities in higher education quality assurance system in china
郭欣 1刘元芳1
作者信息
摘要
中央和地方政府的权力博弈关系与高等教育质量能否得以保障息息相关。在我国高等教育质量保障体系建设中,中央与地方政府存在着＂合作博弈＂与＂非合作博弈＂。在＂合作博弈＂中表现为主动权力博弈形式,在＂非合作博弈＂中表现为隐性权力博弈、灰色权力博弈两种形式。合理划定中央与地方政府在高等教育质量保障体系建设中的权力界限,中央适度让渡一些权力给地方政府,中央和地方政府行使高等教育质量保障权力时需要道德的规约是我国中央和地方政府在高等教育质量保障体系中更好地发挥作用的必由之路。
Abstract
The power game relationship between the central and the local authorities is closely related to higher education quality assurance system.And there exists Cooperative Game and Non-Cooperative Game.In the Cooperative Game,there is a representation such as active power game.While in the Non-Cooperative Game,there are two representations such as underlying power game and gray power game.In order to build a better higher education quality assurance system,it can start from fixing the power limit of the central and the local authorities in a higher education quality assurance system,delegating some management to the local authorities and restraining themselves with morality.
关键词
中央政府/地方政府/博弈Key words
the central authority/the local authorities/game引用本文复制引用
基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA880019)
辽宁省教育科学"十一五"规划重点立项课题(JG08DA009)
出版年
2012
NETL
NSTL
万方数据